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In the Supretne Court 
of the State of Utah 
SOREN J. JESPERSEN, ROY H. 
EAST, HOWARD J. HASSELL 
and ROY vV. BROvVN, doing busi-
ness as POWER ENGINEERI~O 
CO~fP ANY, a partnership, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
DESERET NEWS PUBLISHING 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPOHDEHTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7443 
The plaintiffs agree with the defendant's statement 
of facts as contained in the defendant's brief and des-
ignated as "Statement of the Case" and "Admitted 
Facts" with the additions and corrections nPxt herein-
after noted. 
The defendant examined the premises and particu-
larly the support of the flooring (R. 113, 115, 116, 
117 and 205) prior to the leasing. 
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The following is the description of the demised 
premises as contained in the said lease: 
''The west one hundred forty-five feet (145') 
of that certain building known as building num-
bered one eighty one (181) located at 1710 South 
Redwood Road." (R. 4.) 
The lease by and between the parties to this action 
contained the following language with regard to attor-
ney's fees: 
''Also that the said lessee will pay * * • 
together with all costs and attorney's fees and 
expenses that shall arise from enforcing the cov-
enants of this lease. * * *" (R. 5.) 
It is not e~pressly stated whether the leased prem-
ises includes the land under the building leased (R. 4) 
and plaintiff discusses in point III the construction 
of the lease in that regard. 
The plaintiff at no time during the continuance of 
the lease accepted nor agreed to :any surrender of the 
leased premises (R. 105). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
The evidence is sufficient to support finding No. 3 
to the effect that the defendant stored certain materials 
in such a manner as to break the floor and cause damage 
and to support finding No. 4 to the effect that such 
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damage did not result from reasonable use and wear 
or from damage by the elen1ents. 
PoiNT II. 
The evidence is sufficient to support finding No. 5 
to the effect that ;the reasonable cost of repairing the 
damage is $3,000.00. 
POINT III. 
The evidence is sufficient to support the finding 
that the defendant is liable for rent. 
PoiNT IV. 
Plaintiffs should be awarded additional attorney's 
fees. 
ARGUMENT APPLICABLE TO POINTS 
I, II AND III 
Since defendant's sole ground of appeal is an al-
leged insufficiency of the evidence, plain tiffs deem it 
well to emphasize at the beginning of the argument that 
this is a case at law. This is an action to enforce the 
provisions of a written lease of real property wherein 
no equitable issues are involved. In such a case under 
the provisions of Art. VIII, Sec. 9, Constitution of 
Utah, to-wit: 
"* * * in cases at law the appeal shall be on 
queRtions of law alone,'' 
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4 
it is too well settled to require citation of authority 
that it is the function of this court not to pass upon 
the weight of the evidence nor to determine conflicts 
therein, but to examine it solely for the purpose of 
determining whether or not the judgment finds substan-
tial support in the evidence. 
Defendant does not seem to contend, at least in 
some respects, that the ·plaintiffs' evidence was not 
substantial within the meaning of the rule. At page 
10 of the brief, it speaks of the question of overload, 
saying "the evidence is in direct conflict." At the same 
page it speaks of ·its own expert as "better qualified 
than any other expert at the trial.'' At page 8 the 
brief admits that "plaintiffs' experts testified that the 
sole cause of the collapse was overload." 
Plaintiffs will proceed to state briefly the evidence 
which supports each of the court's findings attacked in 
the order such findings :are mentioned in the defend· 
ant's brief. 
POINT I. 
The following evidence supports the trial court's 
Findings of Fact No. 3 to the effect that defendant 
''stored certain materials therein in such amounts and 
in such a manner that defendant broke said floor and 
sub-flooring or caused said floor :and said sub-flooring 
to be broken and smashed, said pilings to be driven 
downward and out of line,· and the walls of said build-
ing to be broken and pushed out of line, and the whole 
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5 
of said structure to be damaged'', and the trial court's 
Finding of Fact No. 4 that ' 4 defendant has abandoned 
said pre1nises and has refused and failed to restore said 
premises to as good order and condition as when the 
same -..vere entered by defendant, reasonable use and 
wear thereof and damages by the elements excepted, 
although plaintiffs have demanded that defendant so 
restore the premises~ that said damages are in excess 
of reasonable wear of said premises.'' 
Two expert witnesses, structural engineers, were 
called by the plaintiff and their testimony supports the 
foregoing findings. rrhe witness Koch testified that in 
his opinion overloading was the cause of the floor's col-
lapse (R. 54). The witness Gardner testified that in 
his opinion overloading was the cause of the collapse 
and that water-weakening was not the cause. (R. 80, 82) 
There would seem to be no question that there is 
sufficient evidence to support the court's findings that 
physical damage was caused by the use which defend-
ant made of the building. The lease provided: 
''And the said lessee further agrees to de-
liver up said premises to said lessors at the 
expiration of said term in as good order and 
condition as when the same were entered upon 
by said lessee, reasonable use and wear thereof 
and damage b~r the elements excepted * * '~ '' 
In order to be absolved of liability for the damage, the 
defendant must show that one of the two express ex-
rrptions applies. In this connection, the cases hold 
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that the burden of establishing that the damage falls 
within one of the exceptions in ''surrender-up'' clauses 
absolving a lessee for damage rests upon the lessee. See 
Vaughan vs. Mayo Milling Co., 102 S. E. 597 (Virginia); 
Rusted vs. Lamport, 183 N. W. 483 (Minnesota) and 
Oakland Motor Company vs. Meyer, 174 N. E. 154 
(Ohio). 
The trial court has found that the damage was not 
caused by the elements. The trial court further found 
that the damage was caused by the use to which de-
fendant subjected the premises. Defendant contends 
that this use was nevertheless reasonable. It argues in 
effect that it is not liable if it has complied with a tort 
standard of reasonable conduct. It is debatable as to 
whether defendant acted prudently in this case, but the 
authorities hereafter cited reject such a defense in any 
event. 
Plaintiffs submit that this exception, ''reasonable 
use and wear", contains two elements: (a) The use 
must be reasonable. (b) The wear must be reasonable. 
The words mean different things. To consider only 
the conduct of the defendant and to ignore the physical 
result of its tenancy is to deny any force or function 
on the part of the word "wear". This is contrary to 
fundamental rules of constructions. ''Use'' is defined at 
43 Words and Phrases 463, as ''to ·employ for any pur-
pose". Certainly, "wear" means something else than 
that. Plaintiffs submit that it means physical chan~e. 
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It i~ diffcult to see how the damage which wa~ Yi~­
ited upon plaintiff's building in this case can be ch:t :·-
acterized as reasonable wear. Defendant ha~ deserihed 
that dmnage as destruction. "\Ye submit that the only 
sound policy for the courts to take in a situation of this 
sort is to require of a lessee, that if he wishes to be 
exempt frmn the consequences of such substantial dam-
age or destruction, he Inust provide by the terms of his 
lease that the pren1ises shall be put to a specific use 
and that if that use results in damage or destruction~ 
the lessee shall not be liable therefor. 
To accept the contention of the defendant is gro-
tesquely to distort the contract of the parties. It is to 
say that the parties agreed that ·plaintiffs would rent 
the building to defendant and that if defendant merely 
stored newsprint, it mattered not to plaintiffs if the 
building should thereby be destroyed or damaged. 
This defendant was confronted with an emergency. 
It had to secure warehouse space speedily or pay de-
murrage on freight cars. The defendant appeal<~d to 
plaintiffs for warehouse space. The defendant was ex-
perienced in the storing of these materials. ThA plain-
tiffs were not. The written lease contains no warranty 
that the building would sustain the materials. It con-
tains no reference to the use to be made of the building. 
Unless, by contract it PXpressly provided otherwise:', 
defendant assumed the risk of damaging plaintiffs' 
building. It is to be noted also that defendant's agc11t~ 
were apprehensive a~ to the ability of the building to 
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hold up under the proposed load. They expressed con-
cern about this. Nevertheless, they proceeded with the 
leasing of the building and took the gamble. Nmv in 
retrospect they seek to excuse the damage. In the light 
of the factors of defendant's superior experience with 
this particular type of warehousing, and of the absence 
on the part of plaintiffs of any warranty in the lease 
that the building would sustain the weights, does the 
law now deny plaintiffs' redress~ To do so is to disre-
gard entirely the body of substantive law which holds 
that where there is a writing it is the writing, and the 
writing alone which creates and defines the parties' rights 
and liabilities. 
Defendant seeks to escape liability for the damage 
caused plaintiffs' building during defendant's tenancy, 
upon the plea that Hie use made of the building was 
reasonable. The court's attention is invited to the lan-
guage of the lease-the lessee is to return the premises 
in the same condition as they were in when rented-
"reasonable use and wear excepted". Even if the "use" 
made of the building by defendant be considered "reas-
onable"-(to which postulate the ·plaintiffs dissent)-
that alone does not absolve defendant. The covenant 
of the defendant is not a covenant merely to make reas-
onable use of the building-it is an absolute covenant 
to do a specific thing----to-wit: to return the premises 
to plaintiff in the same condition as when rented, reason-
able use and wear excepted. In addition to inquiring 
into the use made of the building by tenant, the test of 
''what wear has the building sustained?'' must be ap-
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plied. The wear in this instance rertainly is abnormal. 
The proposition here urged by the plaintiffs is 
simply the common-law rule which was recognized by 
the court in Powell Y~. Hughes Orphanage (138 S. E. 
637, Virginia), in whirh case there was a lease of a 
building in which the lessee covenanted ''to leave said 
premi~es in good repair, ordinary wear and tear ex-
cepted''. The tenant used the building as a warehouse 
and sections of the building in which tobacco was stored, 
collapsed. The theory of the plaintiff was that the col-
lapse was caused by overloading. Defendant contended 
it was caused by breaking down of piers in the basement 
which supported columns on all the floors, and that there 
\Vas a structural defect undiscoverable to tenant and 
that if pier~ hacl had the strength they appeared to 
have no collapse would have occurred. 
The court at p. 644 (9, 10) says: 
"The covenant to leave the premises in good 
repair, unaffected by statute, was not a covenant 
to use due care to leave them in good repair, but 
an absolute covenant to do a specific thing, to-
wit: to leave the premises in good repair * * * 
This was the common law rule * * * '' 
(The court then refers to a Virginia .statute modify-
ing the rule.) 
Plaintiffs submit that the reasoning of the court 
above set forth is applicable to the case at bar; that 
the defendant breached its covenant to return the prem-
i~P~ in the same condition as when rented. 
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Plaintiffs respectfully ask the court to consider the 
logic attending the use in the ''surrender-up'' covenants 
of leases of such phrases as ''reasonable wear and tear 
excepted" or "reasonable use and wear excepted". Were 
it not for the fact that some wear of a building is inevi-
table, a lessor would wish his building returned in the 
identical state in which it is leased. The exception clauses 
are used to excuse the lessee from liability for usual 
wear-such deterioration or wearing as always are ex-
pected to occur. If the use made of the building results 
in unusual damage it would seem that the lessee should 
bear the damage, "?nless by the contract the lessor has 
warranted that the building is suitable for the specific 
use or has absolved the lessee of liability for any dam-
age resulting from the specific use. Such a principle 
seems to have been recognized in the Powell case (supra) 
where a requested instruction that the landlord could 
not recover for damage to the building if the tenant 
used ordinary care in using the building as a storage 
warehouse and acted on the !advice of a competent build-
ing contractor, was held to have been properly refused 
in the absence of evidence that landlord undertook to 
put building in condition to use for storage purposes. 
In other words, there was no warranty or undertaking 
by the landlord respecting the suitability of the build-
ing for the use to which it was to be put. 
POINT II. 
The following evidence supports the trial court's 
finding No. 5 to the effect that the reasonable cost of 
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restoring said premises to as good order and condition 
as when the same were entered by the defendant, reason-
able use and wear thereof and damage by the elements 
excepted, is $3,000.00. 
The witness Gardner, called by plaintiffs, testified 
to the items necessary to make repairs (R. B2, 83, 84, 
85) and testified that in his opinion the reasonable cost 
of the repairs would be $5,051.21 (R. 86). The defend-
ant's own witness, Ullrich, testified that in his opinion 
the cost of repairs, not taking into account the floor 
-covering and the gas and electrical systems, would be 
$2,450 (R. 175). 
POINT III. 
The evidence is sufficient to support the finding 
that the defendant is liable for rent. 
In its argument upon this point, defendant presup-
poses lack of fault on its own part. As has been pre-
viously pointed out, there is substantial evidence from 
which the court did find that the defendant through its 
own act caused the damage. After that finding there 
can be no reasonable argument that the liability for 
rent ceases. There would seem to be no reason to 
consider the rules applicable where damage comes to the 
leased premises without fault of the lessee. But sinee 
the defendant contends for certain propositions which 
assume the damage by an unavoidable casualty unre-
lated to the acts of the lessee, plaintiffs will consider 
those contentions. 
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Defendant's brief at page 12 cites the minority 
views and particularly the viewes of Brewer, J. in an 
early l{ansas case and later quoted in a later case. 
That view, we think, is properly analyzed in footnote 
1010, page 1193, I Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant as 
follows: 
"The op1n10n of Brewer, J., in Whitaker 
v. Rawly, 25 Kan. 674, 37 Am. Rep. 277, argues 
strongly in favor of relieving the tenant in case 
of destruction of the building. It is submitted, 
however, that the learned writer of the opinion, 
in saying that a lease 'is an agreement for a con-
tinuous interchange of values between landlord 
and tenant, rather than a purchase single and 
completed of a term or estate in lands,'' takes 
a view of a lease which is contrary to the com-
mon-law authorities, though in accordance with 
that of the civil law.'' 
Plaintiffs do not feel it necessary to pursue fur-
ther the defendant's theory that such rule of law is 
not adapted to present-day conditions in our state in 
view of the decision of our highest court in the case 
of Wilson v. Woodruff, 65 Utah 118, 235 P. 3"08. The 
plaintiff in that case suffered personal injuries, his wife 
was killed and his property was damaged all in the 
collapse of part of a building leased. The court affirmed 
a judgment of dismissal, the opinion ending with the 
following statement: 
''We think the evidence in this case clearly 
shows that the injuries sustained resulted from 
defects in the 'premises demised to the plaintiff, 
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"~hich risk he a~snmed when he entered under 
his lease.'' 
If a lessee can and does, absent stipulation to the 
contrary, legally assume such risks of death, injury and 
damage to his property and such has been confirmed 
a~ a Yalid and subsisting part of the law of this state, 
can it be seriously argued that social considerations 
require this court to hold that such lessee cannot legally 
assume liability for payment of rent (certainly a much 
lesser risk) regardless of certain contingencies because 
in the event of the happening of such contingency such 
payment may be harsh as to him 1 Plaintiffs believe 
the cited case disposes of defendant's contentions in 
this regard and that the same case is a valuable prece-
dent in the other phase of the present action a~ will 
be hereafter noted. 
Defendant further argues that the present case is 
a lease of "merely a portion of a building". In this 
connection plaintiffs believe that the defendants haYe 
reached a conclusion which is at least questionable, 
and have apparently done so without an examination 
of the authorities. Plaintiffs believe that ·a determina-
tion of this point is not essential to a proper disposi-
tion of this phase of the action before the court for the 
reasons hereafter more fully set forth, but propose to 
examine the point briefly since a determination favor-
able to the defendant would be a necessary step in 
further examination of its said contention. Defendant 
states in its statement of ''admitted facts'' that there 
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was "no leasing of the land''. No authority or reason 
is given for this interpretation of the written lease. It 
is, of course, patent that the question of whether any 
particular lease includes an interest in land as distin-
guished from an interest in an improvement only is a 
question of interpretation in the particular transaction 
involved, unless the parties state an intention in express 
language. There are the following rules as stated in 
the cases and the authorities to aid in such interpre-
tation: 
"In regard to when an interest in the land 
passes, the general rule is well settled that the 
grant of a house, store, mill, or other building 
carries with it the land under the building". 
4 Thompson on Real Property 255, Section 1726. 
Tiffany states that conclusion as a presumption 
only: 
''It is a question of construction in each 
particular case whether a lease of a building 
includes the earth or soil, and, as above stated, 
there is a presumption in fa:vor of such construc-
tion." I Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant 269, Sec-
tion 26. 
The authority last cited further states, "if a lease 
is in terms of a room or apartment merely, it prima 
facie includes no part of the earth or soil.'' The other 
text mentioned contains similar statements at the cited 
page. 
It is submitted that the two rules of interpreta-
tion stated are logical rules to apply in the fact situa-
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15 
tions mentioned. If a person is given a leasehold intPr-
est in a ~tructure, it is logical to n~~u1nP, absent a 
showing to the contrary, that hi~ leasehold interest in-
cludes the earth or soil to which the improvement at-
taces, and of which the improvement is a part accord-
ing to ~ettled rules of law. On the other hand where 
the leasehold interest is de~cribed as a room or an apart-
ment, there are, in many cases, other parts of the same 
.building· above and below which are in the possession 
<;>f other tenants or the landlord. It would seem that the 
fundamental concept of the common law which viP\\·s 
ownership of the surface as extending downward to 
the center of the earth and upward to the heavens would 
require that such a lease be construed as separating 
the right of occupancy of the surface from right~ to 
occupy a specific room or apartment. 
But it is also submitted that there are, as 1n the 
present case, fact situations which do not fit into the 
category of a lease of an entire building and which give 
more rights than merely the ordinary letting of a room 
or apartment. Another example of such a lease not 
fitting into either category is the case of a lease of a 
modern duplex house where one-half is leased to each 
of two different tenants. 
11 iffany states at the page and serfion last cited: 
''And in the case of one· building, di 'Ticlecl 
into two residences by a vertical partition, it 
would be a question of construction whether a 
lease of one of such residences included the 
ground thereunder or adjoin]ng. '' 
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Applying the rules to the facts of the present case, 
it is further submitted that the following considerations 
weigh in favor of a construction that the lease in ques-
tion included the land: The premises were divided by 
a vertical partition. There were no rooms or other parts 
of the building above or below the leased portion. The 
ingress and egress was by docks directly into the leased 
premises, and not through parts of the building retained 
by the landlord. 
One test would be to assume that the ground below 
the floor was valuable for storage purposes and that 
this lessor had brought an action against this lessee to 
prevent him from using such space to store materials 
of the lessee. In view of the nature of the building and 
the terms of the lease and the circumstances attending 
its execution it is felt that this court would decide in 
favor of the lessee and hold there was a right to so 
use the land. 
If the proper construction of the lease is as indi-
cated and the same included the land under the build-
ing, the defendant virtually admits liability for rent 
unless this court wishes to reject the majority rule here-
inbefore indicated, even if we assume, contrary to the 
findings of the tri:al court that the damage was not caused 
by the lessee. 
POINT IV. 
The lease upon which this suit is based provides 
"that the said lessee will pay * * * all costs and 
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attorney's fees and expenses that shall arise from en-
forcing the covenants of this lease.'' Plaintiffs submit 
that this court should award plaintiffs attorney's fees 
in addition to the a:ward of the trial court, or should 
remand the case to the district court for the purpose of 
making a finding and award of additional attorney's 
fees, said additional fees to be for the services of plain-
tiffs' counsel subsequent to trial of this action. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits: 
1. That there is sufficient evidence to support the 
findings and judgment of the trial court and that the 
judgment appealed from should be affirmed. 
2. That this court, pursuant to the lease of the par-
ties, should award plaintiff additional attorney's fees 
or remand the case to the district court for that purpose. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON 
and 
ALLEN & RUCKENBP,OD, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
Received two copies of foregoing brief this 1st 
day of June, 1950. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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